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ABSTRACT 
Healthcare systems differ greatly across the world, however, it appears that the extent of public 
insurance (publicly/government funded healthcare) is the only institutional characteristic that plays a 
significant role in accounting for the large disparities in total healthcare spending. Other factors, such as 
whether healthcare services are provided by the private or public sector, play much less of a role, 
highlighting the important distinction between how services are provided and how those services are 
funded. A regression analysis is conducted utilising an existing categorisation of the predominately high-
income countries of the OECD in 2009. It is found that more public insurance and less private insurance 
is associated with significantly lower spending after controlling for differences in income through GDP 
and healthcare quality/outcomes through life expectancy. This result is robust to the inclusion of 
additional controls for lifestyle factors and the proportion of the population aged 65 and over, as well as 
the inclusion or exclusion of the US that could otherwise be seen as some kind of outlier. A typical 
country relying largely on private provision and insurance, such as the Netherlands, Germany or the US, 
could reduce total healthcare spending by around a third by moving to a system with extensive public 
insurance whilst retaining extensive private provision of services, a situation typical of some countries 
such as Austria, Greece and Japan. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Many people today have the opportunity to see first-hand how healthcare systems across the globe 
differ greatly, even between developed economies. On one extreme, there are countries such as the UK 
that offer universal, publically provided healthcare that is generally free at the point of delivery. On the 
other extreme are systems, such as that in the US, that are based mainly on private sector healthcare 
provision and funding. 
Figure 1. Total healthcare spending across OECD countries in 2012. 
 
Figure 1 uses the latest available OECD data (OECD, 2014) to show the differences in total (private and 
public) health expenditure per capita of the OECD countries in $US PPP, purchasing power parity, terms 
for 2012. It shows how there exist large disparities among developed countries in terms of total 
spending on healthcare despite similar effectiveness levels in terms of metrics such as cancer survival 
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rates (Squires, 2012). These large spending differences suggest that there is considerable room for 
improving healthcare systems by looking at what characterises different systems and the reasons behind 
any disparities.  
 
Total healthcare spending is often looked at in terms of it as a percentage of a country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) to take into account the fact that richer countries with a higher GDP have a greater 
capacity to spend more on healthcare. This relation is disused in more detail later in this paper but it can 
be seen from Figure 2, which uses 2012 OECD data (OECD, 2014), that there are still considerable 
differences in healthcare spending when it is measured as a percentage of GDP, suggesting that there 
are other factors that play a significant role. 
Figure 2. Total healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP across OECD countries in 2012. 
 
The issue of healthcare spending is one that will only increase in relevance as healthcare spending as a 
percentage of GDP continues to increase in many countries (OECD, n.d.). This suggests that the 
sustainability of healthcare system spending needs to be looked at, especially in the current economic 
context of high public sector debt in many countries. Healthcare provision is something that inevitably 
affects us all so it is an area that is worthy of detailed economic investigation in an attempt to optimise 
policy choices.  
 
Different healthcare systems across the world vary widely in the level of government involvement in the 
free market and there exist many regulatory differences, aspects such as these can be seen as 
institutional differences. This role of healthcare institutions (which this paper defines as the formal 
policies and regulations as well as the more informal norms and arrangements that characterise 
healthcare systems) has been subject to relatively little research. Therefore, looking at the effect of 
these differences from an economic perspective allows the examination of whether different healthcare 
institutions affect healthcare spending and if so, build a theory as to how this relationship works, giving 
an insight into what the optimal policy choices are.  
 
Healthcare has several characteristics that can be seen to separate it from most other goods and 
services such as intrinsic externalities, asymmetric information, uncertainty and the presence of a third 
party agent (Phelps, 2012), i.e. a healthcare professional who makes purchasing decisions on behalf of a 
patient whilst not bearing the costs themselves. It is intuitive that different institutions will have an 
effect on how these characteristics play a role in determining healthcare spending. For example, a doctor 
who is personally compensated for each appointment they have with a patient may have an incentive to 
prescribe follow-up appointments even when they are not strictly necessary. Thereby increasing 
healthcare spending whilst having a limited impact on healthcare quality and outcomes.  
 
The research question that this paper will answer is therefore: How can institutional differences in 
healthcare systems help to account for spending differences around the world? In order to examine this 
question, this paper will first provide a detailed look at the relevant academic literature, followed by a 
description of the methodology that will be used to add to the current literature before then presenting 
the findings. A discussion on the results and possible policy implications concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature review 
 
There is an abundance of existing literature that looks at specific reforms and policy changes on 
healthcare spending as well as on outcomes from the perspective of a single country; however, 
meaningful cross-country comparisons of different systems have only been possible relatively recently. 
Data on total healthcare spending in different developed countries has been available for several 
decades with the finding that “more affluent countries spend proportionally more on health care” 
(Anderson, Hurst, Hussey, & Jee-Hughes, 2000) (i.e. GDP per capita is positively correlated with 
healthcare spending per capita) being made as early as the mid-1980s. Data on healthcare outcomes 
and quality that are comparable across countries have however only become available more recently 
with a paper published in 2000 noting the “scantiness and frailty of the data” (Anderson, Hurst, Hussey, 
& Jee-Hughes, 2000) that they had available. 
 
Reinhardt, Hussey, & Anderson (2004) confirmed the finding of previous studies that GDP per capita 
appears to be one of the most important factors in explaining variation in healthcare spending with a 
regression analysis indicating that it can account for about 90% of the variation in spending across the 
OECD countries in 2001. Their explanation for this being that a higher GDP per capita represents a 
higher ability to pay and therefore increased demand for healthcare. 
  
Squires (2012) made the same observations in relation to spending in $US PPP terms when using OECD 
data from 2009. He looked at the case of the US in relation to other developed countries and found that 
the US does not have a significantly higher supply or use of doctors or hospitals. In most measures the 
US is in fact below the OECD average, therefore suggesting that differences in utilisation cannot account 
for the large total spending differences between the US and other developed countries. Otherwise, it 
could be the case that the US has higher total costs simply because it has higher levels of use. 
 
Anderson, Reinhardt, Hussey, & Petrosyan (2003) came to the same conclusion using earlier OECD data 
from 2000 and concluded that “the difference in spending is caused mostly by higher prices for health 
care goods and services in the United States”.  
 
Squires (2012) used more recent data and found there are significant price differences between 
countries for identical or very similar goods and services such as specific pharmaceuticals, 
doctor/hospital visits and specific procedures. Squires (2012), as well as other literature, also found that 
developed countries have similar healthcare quality levels in terms of metrics such as cancer survival 
rates and the US is “not notably superior to the far less expensive systems”. 
 
There is, however, little research looking at the reasons behind these apparent price differences in 
healthcare so it would be valuable to try to look in more detail at this from an economic perspective. 
Economic theory tells us that institutional factors such as different market structures, levels of 
competition, and government intervention are factors that can have a great impact not only on prices 
but also on innovation over time by affecting the extent to which companies can profit from investment 
into research and development (Motta, 2004).  
 
Some research such as that by Reinhardt, Hussey, & Anderson (2004) indicates that administrative 
complexity and related costs make up a significant proportion of spending in some countries. The same 
authors also note that buyer power differs greatly between countries with some having what is 
effectively a single buyer in the form of the government that holds a great deal of buyer power and 
hence should theoretically be in a stronger position to negotiate lower prices with suppliers. On the other 
hand, there are countries with many fragmented buyers that hold little buyer power.  
 
Frank (2001) looked at this from a quantitative perspective and found that in the US, uninsured cash 
payers of prescription medication pay significantly more than the prices paid by the insurance providers 
or buyers at the hospital or federal level. This being due to differences in buyer power and the ability for 
sellers to successfully use differential pricing strategies. Therefore, more up to date research into 
whether differences between countries in the levels of buyer power exhibited by different healthcare 
market structures would be beneficial as this could possibly help to explain spending differences. 
 
Much of the existing literature is quite US-centric, however, it is also useful to look at other countries 
such as Japan, which has a private sector dominated delivery system and has health status statistics 
that are among the best in the world despite spending relatively little on healthcare compared to other 
OECD countries (Hashimoto, et al., 2011). It has been able to accomplish cost containment mainly 
through a tightly controlled nationally uniform schedule set by the government (Hashimoto, et al., 
2011). Other countries such as Canada, the UK, France, and Germany have also used budget and price 
controls as a method of healthcare cost containment with differing degrees of effectiveness (Stabile, et 
al., 2013). 
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Despite most literature looking at healthcare systems in high-income countries, there is evidence that 
the healthcare systems of low and middle-income countries are characterised by the same issues as 
those in higher income countries. A recent systematic review of healthcare system performance in 
middle and low-income countries found that “the private sector appeared to have lower efficiency than 
the public sector, resulting from higher drug costs, perverse incentives for unnecessary testing and 
treatment, greater risks of complications, and weak regulation” (Basu, Andrews, Kishore, Panjabi, & 
Stuckler, 2012), issues similar to those highlighted in the literature looking at high-income countries.  
 
There is a lack of existing literature that looks to identify institutional differences across different 
countries in a reliable and consistent way; however, a recent OECD working paper (Joumard, André, & 
Nicq, 2010) offers some insights into this area of research. It has developed a comprehensive set of 20 
indicators on health policies and institutions that “allows the empirical characterisation of health care 
systems and the identification of groups of countries sharing similar health institutions”. They identified 
six groups of countries sharing similar healthcare institutions with one extreme, group 1, consisting of 
countries such as Germany and the Netherlands that have extensive private market sector healthcare 
provision, i.e. things such as doctors and hospitals being supplied by the private sector, whilst also 
relying on basic healthcare insurance coverage from the private sector. On the other extreme, group 6 
includes countries such as the UK and Italy that have mostly public provision and public 
insurance/funding, have strong gatekeeping systems such as enforcing patients to first contact a 
primary care provider before being referred for further care and have strong budget controls. The 
precise groupings are shown in Figure 3 and “sensitivity analysis shows that the clusters identified are 
fairly robust.” (Joumard, André, & Nicq, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
The 20 indicators they used to group the countries are developed from the results of a questionnaire of 
269 mainly qualitative items collecting information on the healthcare system characteristics and was 
sent out by the OECD to its members in 2008 with all apart from the United States responding by early 
2009. The results of the 29 responded countries were validated by checking for consistency with experts’ 
knowledge and understanding as well as ensuring cross-country consistency (Paris, Devaux, & Wei, 
2010). Using this recent identification of OECD countries with similar healthcare institutions, together 
with data on healthcare spending and controls for other factors that have been found to be, or are likely 
to be, related to healthcare spending, it is possible to identify the extent to which intuitional differences 
affect healthcare spending and which aspects are most significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Groups of countries sharing broadly similar institutions. (Joumard, André, & Nicq, 2010) 
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3. Methodology 
 
As is clear from the literature review, most existing research has concentrated on high-income, 
developed countries, however, it appears that the healthcare systems of low and middle-income 
countries are characterised by the same issues so findings and implications coming from looking at high-
income countries should still, to a certain extent, be relevant to other countries. This paper will therefore 
concentrate on high-income, developed countries and this also simplifies cross country comparisons as it 
is most appropriate to compare countries that have similar levels of healthcare quality (although this will 
still need to be taken into account) but still differ significantly in terms of total spending levels. 
 
This paper will therefore focus on a selection of developed OECD countries that have healthcare systems 
that sometimes appear to be very different from an institutional perspective but are relatively similar in 
terms of quality. The institutional differences between healthcare systems in terms of market structures, 
competition levels, and government intervention and their role on healthcare spending can be explored 
by looking for evidence of differences between the six groups of countries sharing similar healthcare 
institutions identified by Joumard, André, & Nicq (2010). The specifics of how they grouped the 29 
countries being covered earlier in the literature review section. The sample includes all OECD countries 
in 2009 except the United States as they did not respond to the questionnaire that was used to form 
institutional indicators and group countries.  
 
This omission of the US is unfortunate as it has the highest healthcare spending per capita in the world 
and is the subject of much of the existing literature. However, group 1 consists of countries reliant on 
extensive private market sector healthcare provision whilst also relying on basic healthcare insurance 
coverage from the private sector. The exiting literature appears to indicate this would be a suitable 
characterisation for the US, especially in 2009 before more recent reforms. Naderi & Meier (2010) note 
that in the US “voluntary, private insurance represents the principal system of coverage for the majority 
of the population” and that “there is a palpable absence of government regulation” again suggesting that 
group 1 appears to be most appropriate categorisation. However, they also note that the US has “an 
exceedingly high number of individuals without health insurance” and is in many ways different to the 
system in the Netherlands, a group 1 country, such as it not guaranteeing universal coverage (Naderi & 
Meier, 2010). These factors suggest that the US may be extreme, even in relation to the group 1 
countries and possibly belongs in a group of its own, making meaningful comparisons difficult. There is 
also the complicating matter of institutions across the US being far from fixed across the country with 
policies and regulations differing between states. Due to these issues, analyses will be conducted with 
the original 29 country sample excluding the US as well as with a larger 30 country sample including the 
US as a group 1 country. This will therefore allow observation of the impact of including the US as a 
group 1 country as opposed to excluding it entirely. 
 
As this paper looks at actual spending levels between different countries, the dependent variable that is 
most appropriate to look at is per capita total healthcare spending in current US dollars in purchasing 
power parity, PPP, terms. Data on this was obtained from the OECD Statistics database (OECD, n.d.). As 
the country groupings were formed from surveys and data obtained in 2009 and early 2010 the 
subsequent analysis was carried out using data from 2009 although for Turkey this was not available 
and data from 2008 was used instead. 
 
As well as the independent variable of the country groupings, other control variables are included to 
better isolate the effect of the country groupings. Previous literature finds a clear relation between 
average income in the form of GDP per capita and health expenditures across countries. To account for 
this, GDP per capita in current US dollars in PPP terms for 2009 is included, with data again obtained 
from the OECD statistics database (OECD, n.d.).  
 
Life expectancy at birth is often used in the existing literature as a good indicator for the overall 
effectiveness of a healthcare system and the direction of any relationship with health expenditures is 
almost certainly not one-way and is instead more complex with it being endogenous to an extent. It is 
intuitive that higher health care spending would result in a higher life expectancy but it is also intuitive 
that if a higher life expectancy signals a population that makes “healthier” choices then one would 
expect a negative effect on healthcare spending. Irrespective of the precise relationship, including life 
expectancy at birth as a control variable allows the effect of the country groupings to be observed more 
directly as it effectively allows us to observe what impact the groupings have on spending in a scenario 
where all countries have the same level of overall effectiveness as measured by life expectancy at birth. 
Again, data from 2009 that is obtained from the OECD is used (OECD, n.d.).  
 
The review of the existing literature has shown that tobacco use, obesity and alcohol consumption are 
the three lifestyle factors that are most commonly looked at in relation to healthcare outcomes and 
spending as there is evidence that higher rates of any of these can contribute to worse health outcomes 
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and associated higher spending. It is unlikely that these factors are not completely exogenous as one 
can imagine an efficient, low-cost healthcare system that does well at prioritising spending on relatively 
cheap preventative measures such as offering “quit smoking” aids having better statistics for these 
lifestyle factors. Despite the uncertainty of the exact relationship and direction between these factors 
and healthcare spending, it is still appropriate to include them as additional controls as the precise 
relationships are not the subject of this paper. 
OECD data is obtained on the percentage of the population aged 15+ who are daily smokers, the 
measured obese population proportion and litres of alcohol per capita consumed per year by those aged 
15 or over. Again, data from 2009 is used (OECD, n.d.). 
 
The exiting literature also notes that the population demographics of a country can also play a role in 
determining healthcare spending with the elderly generally requiring more (and more expensive) 
treatment. Therefore, the proportion of the population that is aged 65 and over is included as a control 
variable. Again, data from 2009 is obtained from the OECD (OECD, n.d.). 
 
Different ordinary least squares regression (OLS) analyses are conducted, regressing health expenditure 
per capita $US PPP against combinations of the dummy variables for the country groupings 1 to 6, a 
constant, GDP per capita in $US PPP, life expectancy at birth, the proportion of the population aged 65 
and over, and the three lifestyle factors listed before.  
 
First, regressions are run regressing health expenditure per capita $US PPP against only a constant and 
GDP per capita in $US PPP in order to check the relation between GDP per capita and health 
expenditure. Next, the dummy variables for the groups are included and different regressions are run 
showing the impact of different specifications such as including the controls for lifestyle factors. The 
different specifications are explained in detail in the following results section. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 1 shows the results of a regression analysis that looks at three specifications; GDP per capita 
alone (regressions 1 and 2), a model with GDP per capita as well as life expectancy at birth and dummy 
variables for groups 1 to 6 (regressions 3 and 4), and the “complete” model with additional lifestyle 
controls and a control for the proportion of the population aged 65 and over (regressions 5 and 6). For 
each of these specifications the regression is run for the original sample of 29 countries and the 
extended sample of 30 countries including the US and assuming the US is a group 1 country. 
 
Table 1. OLS regression analysis, dependent variable: health expenditure per capita $US PPP. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Constant   468.76 366.27 287.99 510.94         
GDP per capita 0.077*** 0.0097 0.085*** 0.014 
 
0.054*** 0.0095 0.066*** 0.015 0.058*** 0.011 0.063*** 0.017 
Life expectancy     179.54*** 47.78 125.07 77.04 148.91** 66.00 156.38 100.49 
% Obese         3.53 20.21 53.11* 26.77 
% Smokers         14.41 24.44 -5.84 36.70 
Alcohol 
consumption 
        4.61 59.87 -81.95 87.24 
% 65+         31.07 38.53 49.60 58.40 
Group 1     -12450.77*** 3607.13 -7897.46 5792.91 -11071.42** 4926.59 -11117.86 7502.69 
Group 2     -12773.48*** 3673.36 -8807.06 5933.62 -11318.84** 5057.01 -12105.96 7697.55 
Group 3     -13538.48*** 3632.12 -9625.45 5867.42 -12216.28** 4966.91 -12669.29 7562.84 
Group 4     -13234.50*** 3621.21 -9291.15 5847.81 -11686.23** 5004.61 -12890.34 7612.61 
Group 5     -13043.27*** 3613.69 -9096.57 5835.11 -11598.71** 4980.43 -12504.95 7579.62 
Group 6     -13082.95*** 3603.85 -9168.08 5820.22 -11702.78** 4972.46 -12520.95 7568.41 
N 29 30 29 30 29 30 
R2 0.70 0.59 0.87 0.76 0.88 0.80 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.57 0.83 0.68 0.80 0.68 
Wald test F-
statistic for 
equality in the 
group 
coefficients  
  2.70** 2.71** 2.28* 2.59* 
Note: *p < 0.10.  **p < 0.05.  ***p < 0.01. 
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In regressions 3 to 6 the inclusion of dummy variables for each group and no constant implies that the 
coefficient for each group corresponds to the constant term for each group. Therefore, if there are no 
level differences between the groups after controlling for the other variables, the coefficients for each 
group would be expected to be equal. This null hypothesis can be tested using a Wald test and the F-
statistic as well as its significance are reported in Table 1. 
 
The GDP per capita coefficient is positive and statistically significant at at least the 1% significance level 
in all the regressions. When it is included as the only independent variable along with a constant, it is 
able to explain around 70% of the variation between the 29 countries excluding the US (regression 1) 
but this falls to around 60% when the US is included (regression 2). 
 
The additional lifestyle controls and control for the proportion of the population aged 65 and over appear 
to have a very limited impact on the 29 country sample excluding the US with the R2 increasing only 
slightly from 0.87 to 0.88 and the adjusted R2 falling from 0.83 to 0.80 between (3) and (5) and the 
controls being statistically insignificant, at least individually, in (5). They have more of an impact on the 
30 country sample including the US with the R2 increasing from 0.76 to 0.80. However, the fact that the 
adjusted R2 remains at 0.68 between (4) and (6) suggests that in this sample the additional controls 
again provide little additional explanatory power. 
 
In both specifications, the coefficients for the dummy variables for each group are negative and 
statistically significant at at least the 5% significance level in the 29 country sample excluding the US 
(regressions 3 and 5). When the US is included, none of the coefficients are significant at at least the 
10% level (regressions 4 and 6). However, as these coefficients effectively correspond to the constant 
term associated with each group, their levels and reported statistical significance related to the null 
hypothesis of them being equal to 0 are not of particular interest. What is more important to look at is 
the differences, or lack of, between these coefficients. 
 
The Wald test testing the null hypothesis that these group coefficients are equal to each other finds that 
this null hypothesis can be rejected for both sample sets, including and excluding the US, at at least the 
10% significance level in the model with the additional controls (regressions 5 and 6). In the model with 
fewer controls (regressions 3 and 4), it can be rejected at the 5% significance level for both samples. 
Consequently, there is strong evidence that there are differences in spending levels between the groups.  
 
The coefficient for group 1 is the highest (least negative) in all the regressions, which suggests that 
group 1 countries have higher healthcare expenditures after controlling for several possible confounding 
variables. To test this more completely, the regressions 3 to 6 can be specified as having a constant 
term in place of the group 1 dummy variable with the other repressors remaining intact. This implies 
that the regression takes group 1, extensive private provision and private insurance, as a baseline and 
the coefficients for the dummy variables relating to groups 2 to 6 correspond to changes in expenditure 
as a result from a country being in one of these other groups whilst holding the other variables constant. 
The results of this regression analysis are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. OLS regression analysis, dependent variable: health expenditure per capita $US PPP, Group 1 
baseline. 
 
 
 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Constant  -12450.77 3607.13 -7897.46 5792.91 -11071.42** 4926.59 -11117.86 7502.69 
GDP per capita 0.054*** 0.0095 0.066*** 0.015 0.058*** 0.011 0.063*** 0.02 
Life expectancy 179.54*** 47.78 125.07 77.04 148.91** 66.00 156.38 100.49 
% Obese     3.53 20.21 53.11* 26.77 
% Smokers     14.41 24.44 -5.84 36.70 
Alcohol consumption     4.61 59.87 -81.95 87.24 
% 65+     31.07 38.53 49.60 58.40 
Group 2 -322.72 354.92 -909.60 561.03 -247.42 406.00 -988.10 575.22 
Group 3 -1087.71*** 319.47 -1727.99*** 495.78 -1144.86*** 360.41 -1551.43*** 534.58 
Group 4 -783.73* 380.71 -1393.69** 603.22 -614.81 530.62 -1772.48** 726.22 
Group 5 -592.50* 336.93 -1199.12** 528.78 -527.29 395.65 -1387.09** 542.00 
Group 6 -632.18* 310.82 -1270.63** 480.93 -631.36* 355.90 -1403.09*** 487.79 
N 29 30 29 30 
R2 0.87 0.76 0.88 0.80 
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.68 0.80 0.68 
Note: *p < 0.10.  **p < 0.05.  ***p < 0.01. 
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In both specifications and both samples, the coefficients for the dummy variables (which correspond to 
the effect on healthcare spending of a country being in a group other than the baseline group of group 
1) are negative for all the groups 2 to 6. The results are however not always statistically significant.  
 
The difference between group 1 and 3 is always statistically significant at the 1% level however the 
difference between group 1 and 2 is never statistically significant at any reasonable level, i.e. 10%. The 
statistical significance of the differences between group 1 and groups 4, 5 and 6 is dependent on 
whether the additional controls are included and on the inclusion of the US as a group 1 country.  In 
general, the differences become more statistically significant when the US is included with them all being 
significant at at least the 5% significance level in both models when the US is included as a group 1 
country (regressions 8 and 10).  
 
The coefficients of the repressors other than the group dummy variables, the R2 values and adjusted R2 
values for the models are the same as seen before as these regressions are simply alternative 
specifications of regressions 3 to 6.   
 
At least some of the differences in healthcare spending implied by the coefficients on the group dummy 
variables are economically significant. Taking the most conservative coefficient for group 3 from the 
regression without additional controls and the sample excluding the US (regression 7), it implies that a 
country that is in group 3 (mostly private provision but mostly public insurance) will have $1088 lower 
healthcare spending per capita than a country in group 1 (mostly private provision and insurance) that 
has the same wealth level in terms GDP per capita and the same overall healthcare effectiveness and 
outcomes in terms of life expectancy at birth. With healthcare spending per capita across the sample of 
29 countries, i.e. excluding the US, having a mean of $3183, this equates to 34% lower healthcare 
spending. 
 
The analysis in Table 2 compares groups 2 to 6 with group 1 as a baseline and therefore allows 
identification of significant differences between group 1 with the other groups. Through alternative 
specifications, different groups can be specified as the baseline group that the other groups are 
compared to and all possible combinations of differences between groups can be tested for statistical 
significance. This analysis is done for both models (with and without additional controls) and both 
samples (29 countries excluding the US and 30 countries with the US included as a group 1 country) 
with a summary of the exact results being reported in the appendix of this paper in Tables A1-4. 
 
What is found is that there is limited evidence of differences among groups 2 to 6 (the significant 
differences between group 1 and the other groups having already been shown and analysed, see Table 
2). The only differences that are statistically significant at at least the 10% level are between groups 2 
and 3 which is significant at the 5% level in both models, with and without additional controls, with the 
original 29 country sample excluding the US. When the US is included as a group 1 country, this 
difference is no longer statistically significant. In both cases group 3 has a negative coefficient, implying 
lower healthcare spending, when compared to the baseline of group 2. 
 
As well as looking at the differences between each group simultaneously, it is also useful to look at the 
difference between each individual group and the other groups taken as a whole, e.g. group 1 against 
groups 2 to 6 taken as one group. This can be accomplished by running a separate regression for each 
group with only the dummy variable for that group in the repressors as well a constant term. The results 
of such an analysis are shown in Table 3 using a model without the additional controls as they were 
found to add little explanatory power in the previous regression analyses and with the original 29 
country sample excluding the US.  
 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Constant -13732*** 3699.04 -12005*** 4115.42 -13269*** 3661.46 -12834*** 4108.88 -12914*** 4139.45 -12831*** 4160.18 
GDP per capita 0.052*** 0.0097 0.055*** 0.011 0.058*** 0.0097 0.054*** 0.011 0.055*** 0.011 0.055*** 0.011 
Life expectancy 188.06*** 48.94 165.29*** 54.51 182.44*** 48.45 177.09*** 54.35 177.54*** 54.72 176.68*** 54.94 
Group 1 712.91** 280.34           
Group 2   346.41 311.91         
Group 3     -627.56** 238.70       
Group 4       -201.24 353.04     
Group 5         16.35 290.14   
Group 6           -36.61 252.89 
N 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R2 0.83 0.80 0.83 0.79 0.79 0.79 
Adjusted R2 0.81 0.77 0.81 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Table 3. OLS regression analysis, dependent variable: health expenditure per capita $US PPP, individual group effect compared 
to other groups taken as a whole. 
Note: *p < 0.10.  **p < 0.05.  ***p < 0.01. 
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Looking at Table 3, it is observed that the coefficients for GDP per capita and life expectancy are very 
similar across the different regressions and are always highly statistically significant, indicating 
robustness.  
 
Only group 1 and group 3 are found to be statistically significant at the 5% level with all the other 
groups being insignificant. This suggests that only groups 1 and 3 are significantly different from the 
other groups with the other groups not showing a significant difference from the other groups when they 
are taken as a whole. As an example for clarification, group 1 is significantly different from the other 
groups, 2 to 6, when they are considered as one group, i.e. not group 1. 
 
Group 1 has a positive coefficient indicating higher healthcare spending per capita and group 3 has a 
negative coefficient indicating lower healthcare spending per capita. These results are consistent with 
the results found before.  
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The results of the regressions including just GDP per capita as the sole independent variable confirm the 
findings of Reinhardt, Hussey, & Anderson (2004), as well as other studies, that GDP per capita appears 
to be one of the most important factors in explaining variation in healthcare spending. Their explanation 
for this being that a higher GDP per capita represents higher ability to pay. Their regression analysis 
indicated that it can account for about 90% (R2 = 0.94) of the variation in spending across the 30 OECD 
countries in 2001 although the results of this paper appear to be suggest this figure is around 60% (R2 
= 0.97) for the same 30 OECD countries in 2009 (regression 2). However, in their regression 
Luxembourg and Norway were excluded as “Luxembourg’s GDP is unusually high from international 
financial services, and Norway’s is unusually high by virtue of its oil revenues” (Reinhardt, Hussey, & 
Anderson, 2004). Excluding Luxembourg and Norway from the regression of the 2009 data and hence 
repeating their regression exactly (there have been no new OECD members between 2001 and 2009) 
gives an R2 of 0.82. There is therefore still strong evidence that GDP per capita is a strong determinant 
of total healthcare spending, however, there is some evidence that the relation is less strong in 2009 
than in 2001. This would imply that other factors such as the institutional differences that are the topic 
of this paper may have become more important in relation to determining healthcare spending. 
 
The results show that after controlling for differences in GDP and healthcare quality/outcomes through 
life expectancy, there are some significant differences between the six groups of OECD countries in 2009 
that share similar healthcare institutions identified by Joumard, André, & Nicq (2010). This therefore 
suggests that healthcare institutions do play a significant role in determining healthcare spending.   
 
Adding further controls for lifestyle factors such as smoking, alcohol consumption and obesity as well as 
the proportion of the population aged 65 and over does not appear to significantly increase the 
predictive capability compared to a model without these additional controls, suggesting that these 
controls play a relatively insignificant role in determining healthcare spending.  
 
There is strong evidence that having the institutional characteristics typical of a group 1 country, 
namely, reliance on private provision and private insurance, is associated with having the highest total 
healthcare expenditures, a finding that is robust to different specifications, the inclusion of additional 
controls and the inclusion or exclusion of the US as a group 1 country. Part of this higher spending is 
likely due to administrative costs being higher for countries relying on private insurance for basic 
coverage, i.e. group 1 (Joumard, André, & Nicq, 2010). In 2007 administrative costs were found to be 
less than 2% of total healthcare spending in Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Norway and Portugal which are 
all in either group 5 or 6 whereas in some countries such as the United States, administrative costs 
exceeded 7% of total spending (Joumard, André, & Nicq, 2010). These figures suggest that in some 
countries administrative costs do make up a significant proportion of healthcare spending and there is 
room for significant savings. Reinhardt, Hussey, & Anderson (2004) also found that administrative 
complexity and related costs make up a significant proportion of spending in some countries with the US 
healthcare system being described as an “administrative monstrosity”.    
 
Group 2 of private provision but public insurance for basic coverage with significant supplementary 
private insurance was never found to be significantly different from group 1. This is probably because 
there is still extensive private insurance and the only distinction from group 1 is that it there exists some 
basic public insurance coverage, therefore it shares many institutional characteristics with group 1. 
 
There is evidence that group 3 with private provision but extensive public insurance with little 
supplementary private insurance has the lowest costs with the difference from group 1 being statistically 
significant and this finding being robust to different specifications, the inclusion of additional controls and 
the inclusion or exclusion of the US as a group 1 country. Furthermore, it is found that group 3 has 
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significantly lower spending when compared to the other groups taken together. Healthcare spending 
may be reduced due to what is predominately a single-payer system with the government providing the 
vast majority of healthcare financing. This gives the government a great deal of buyer power which 
should theoretically give the government a greater ability to negotiate lower prices, even in a situation 
where there is mainly private provision of services. Relying less on private insurance and more on public 
insurance should also limit the impact of possible market failures such as adverse selection in the private 
insurance market caused by an information asymmetry between the consumer and the insurer regarding 
the consumer’s health condition. The existence of which could theoretically result in higher insurance 
premiums and higher total healthcare spending (Joumard, André, & Nicq, 2010).   
 
Groups 4, 5 and 6 all correspond to countries and healthcare institutions that have mostly public 
provision and public insurance but differ with respect to gatekeeping (where patients must first contact a 
primary care provider before being referred for further care), users’ choice of providers and strictness of 
any budget constraint. No significant differences are found between these groups which suggests that in 
systems with mostly public provision and insurance, other institutional factors such as these play little 
role in determining healthcare spending.  
 
There is strong evidence that public provision and public insurance, as in groups 4, 5 and 6, results in 
significantly lower spending than reliance on private provision and private insurance as in group 1. There 
is however less strong evidence for a significant difference between a situation with public provision and 
public insurance and the situation that appears to have the lowest total costs and only differs in the 
respect of having extensive private rather than public provision, that of a system relying on private 
provision but with extensive public insurance, group 3. Therefore, there is weak evidence for institutional 
differences on the provision side, in terms of private or public provision, playing a role in determining 
total spending.  
 
 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
It appears that the only institutional difference that plays any significant role in accounting for 
healthcare spending differences around the world is the extent of public insurance (publicly/government 
funded healthcare) with more public insurance and less private insurance being associated with 
significantly lower spending after controlling for differences in wealth through GDP and healthcare 
quality/outcomes through life expectancy. This result is robust to the inclusion of additional controls for 
lifestyle factors (smoking, obesity and alcohol consumption) and the proportion of the population aged 
65+. The result is also robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the US as a group 1 country.  
 
The results suggest that these differences are economically as well as statistically significant. A typical 
country with extensive private provision and insurance such as the Netherlands, Germany or the US 
could reduce healthcare spending by around a third by moving to a system with extensive public 
insurance whilst retaining extensive private provision of services.   
 
As a policy recommendation, on the funding side, public insurance should be maximised in order to 
minimise total healthcare spending. Further research is however needed to identify the costs of such 
reforms and this is likely to vary considerably from country to country. There is also the issue of whether 
increasing public insurance and the associated tax increases would be supported by public opinion, as 
well as the feasibility of the relevant reforms under the different political institutions that exist in 
different countries. 
 
Another limitation of this research is that it only considers the impact on total spending whilst keeping 
the healthcare outcome of life expectancy fixed. There are likely other aspects that should be considered 
such as health inequalities and the quality of life offered under different systems as this may differ from 
life expectancy but is still an outcome that many would argue is important to consider. For example, a 
system may spend more by spending more on treatment that does not extend a patient’s life but does 
significantly improve their quality of life whilst they are alive. However, quality of life is inherently a very 
subjective measure and is therefore an example of the difficulty in controlling for many possible 
healthcare outcome measures that are hard to measure as objectively as life expectancy can be. Future 
research should therefore look how this limitation can be addressed.  
 
The impact on research and development spending should also be considered as it is likely that the 
incentives for investment will differ between systems with different institutional characteristics. This is 
relevant when looking at the likelihood of innovations that would almost certainly affect healthcare 
systems and spending in the long term.  
 
 
 11 Healthcare Spending: The Role of Healthcare Institutions from an International Perspective 
 
This research also only looked at 30 predominantly high-income countries and used six rather broad 
categories to group these countries so it would be beneficial for future research to look at categorising 
more countries and look at the role of more precisely defined institutional differences. 
 
The categories and other data used date back to 2009 so it may well be the case that there have since 
been significant institutional changes in certain countries. Hence, it would be good to look at collecting 
more recent data on the state of healthcare institutions across countries. This would also allow the 
examination of the impact of any reforms and allow the conclusions and policy implications of this paper 
to be tested.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Summary of the group dummy variable coefficients in different OLS regressions with different 
baseline groups, N=29, no additional controls.  
 
Table A2. Summary of the group dummy variable coefficients in different OLS regressions with different 
baseline groups, N=30, no additional controls. 
 
Table A3. Summary of the group dummy variable coefficients in different OLS regressions with different 
baseline groups, N=29, additional controls. 
 
Table A4. Summary of the group dummy variable coefficients in different OLS regressions with different 
baseline groups, N=30, additional controls. 
 
 
  
 
Baseline group 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 
  B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Group 1             
Group 2             
Group 3 -1087.71*** 319.47 -765.00** 320.86         
Group 4 -783.73* 380.71           
Group 5 -592.50* 336.93           
Group 6 -632.18* 310.82           
 
Baseline group 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 
  B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Group 1             
Group 2             
Group 3 -1727.99*** 495.78           
Group 4 -1393.69** 603.22           
Group 5 -1199.12** 528.78           
Group 6 -1270.63** 480.93           
 
Baseline group 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 
  B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Group 1             
Group 2             
Group 3 -1144.86*** 360.41 -897.44** 398.43         
Group 4             
Group 5             
Group 6 -631.36 355.90           
 Baseline group 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 
  B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Group 1             
Group 2             
Group 3 -1551.43*** 534.58           
Group 4 -1772.48** 726.22           
Group 5 -1387.09** 542.00           
Group 6 -1403.09*** 487.79           
Note: *p < 0.10.  **p < 0.05.  ***p < 0.01.  
Only significant (p < 0.10) coefficients/differences reported in tables A1-4 
Figures with identical magnitude and significance but with an opposite coefficient sign that exist to the other side of the 
diagonal are not reported for clarity in A1-4. 
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